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COMPARING THE US & THE EU FAILING
FIRM DEFENSE: REFLECTIONS FROM AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
MarianelaL6pez-Galdos*

T"he

I. INTRODUCTION

present paper is aimed at analyzing the doctrine
of failing firm defense in both the United States
("US") and the European Union ("EU") by describing
relevant case law and exploring the main problems associated with its enforcement. As this paper will conclude,
when firms are failing during economic crisis, antitrust
laws can play a key role in reactivating the economy,
provided that the antitrust authorities apply the rule of
reason and economic analysis accurately.
The analysis will be divided into several sections.
The first two sections of the paper discuss the evolution
of the failing firm defense in the US and in EU jurisdictions. In evaluating this evolution, we must delve into
relevant case law and the related regulations. The second
section will analyze the main dilemmas posed by application of the failing firm defense. These include analysis
of the requirements of the failing firm defense test, the
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question of the failing firm division, the problem of the
enforcement of the failing company defense in oligopolistic markets, and the consideration of efficiencies. The
final section will discuss social and environmental concerns when applying the failing company defense. The
concluding analysis will contain remarks whereby the
main concerns associated with the failing firm defense
will be summarized.

II. THE U.S. ORIGIN OF THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE
The US 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1 (the
"US Horizontal Merger Guidelines") provide orientation
about the failing company defense in the US. In this regard, § 5.1 of the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines provides that an undertaking will qualify as a failing firm,
and thus can be admitted under the failing company defense, when the following four cumulative conditions are
met:
(i) the failing firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near future;
(ii) it would not be able to reorganize successfully
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act;2
(iii) it has made unsuccessful good faith efforts to
elicit reasonable alternative offers of acquisition of the
assets of the failing firm that would both keep its tangible and intangible assets in the relevant market and pose
a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger; and,
(iv) absent the acquisition, the assets of the failing
firm would exit the relevant market.
The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines were revised
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES
§
5
(1997),
available
at
1

https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergerreview/hmg.pdf.
2 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
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in 1997 but gave no further clarification to what was already stated in 1992 concerning failing firms. That said,
the failing firm defense test, as defined in the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, is the result of various US Supreme Court decisions. Initially, the failing company defense did not exist in the US legal framework. In 1930,
the US Supreme Court established the first decision concerning the failing firm defense in the landmark case International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.' With
this decision, the failing company defense was installed
in the US. Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly
state that it was setting the boundaries for a failing company defense in the US, later developments prove that International Shoe inaugurated what was later named the
failing firm defense under US antitrust legislation.
Indeed, in 1930 the US Supreme Court took the
opportunity to balance the consequences of approving a
prima facie illegal merger with the consequences of banning such merger. Eventually, the Court decided to approve the merger because the market conditions showed
that otherwise, the acquired company and its assets
would disappear from the market, which would have had
more harmful consequences than allowing a higher degree of concentration in the market. In this regard, the
US Supreme Court ruled:
In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the
grave probability of a business failure with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the
communities where its plants were operated, we
hold that the purchase of its capital stock by a
competitor (there being no other prospective
purchaser), not with a purpose to lessen competition, but to facilitate the accumulated business
of the purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences otherwise
probable, is not in contemplation of law prejudi-

I See Int'l Shoe

Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).

300

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 28:2/3

cial to the public and does not substantially[...].1
It is understood that
and found to be illegal, the
so long as: (1) the acquired
of business failure, and (2)
purchaser.'

when a merger is prima facie
company is considered failing
firm faces a grave probability
there is no other prospective

In 1950, Congress, when amending § 7 of the Clayton Act, decided to include the failing firm defense based
on the decision in InternationalShoe:.
The argument has been made that the proposed
bill, if passed, would have the effect of preventing a company which is in a failing or bankrupt
condition from selling out. The committee is in
full accord with the proposition that any firm in
such a condition should be free to dispose of its
stock or assets. The committee, however, do not
believe that the proposed bill will prevent sales
of this type. The judicial interpretation on this
point goes back many years and is abundantly
clear. According to decisions of the Supreme
Court, the Clayton Act does not apply in bankruptcy or receivership cases.
Moreover, the
Court has held, with respect to this specific section, that a company does not have to be actually
in a state of bankruptcy to be exempt from its
provisions; it is sufficient that it is heading in
that direction with the probability that bankruptcy will ensure.6
However, neither the US Supreme Court nor Congress
clarified how the failing firm defense should be applied.
In this regard, the applicable test under the failing firm
defense was clarified in Citizen Publishing Co. v. United

4

Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302-303.

1See PHauiP E. AREEDA & HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Vol. IV, I

970b (2d ed. 2006).
6 Celler-Kefauver Act is a United States federal law passed in 1950
that reformed and strengthened the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914
which had amended the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.
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States! In particular, the Supreme Court' reiterated the
failing company defense test based on what it had previously ruled in International Shoe.9 In Citizen Publishing,
the Court added a third requirement to the test it established in International Shoe: the impossibility of a reorganization through receivership or bankruptcy. 10
The Citizen Publishing test was confirmed in the
following two Supreme Court decisions: United States v.
General Dynamics Co.11 and United States v. Greater Buffalo Press.12 In the former, the Court adopted the idea of
the "weak competitor."13 The concept of the "weak competitor" states that because the market share of the acquired firm was low compared to the rest of the competitors, the combined market share of the resulting merger
could not be troublesome.
The Supreme Court decisions and US Horizontal
Merger Guidelines make it obvious that the failing firm
defense exists under the US regime. However, certain
important questions remain unanswered. In this sense,
the enforcement and application of the failing firm defense seems to be quite ambiguous. Admittedly, lawyers
and judges still debate the following issues: how could
one prove that there is no alternative purchaser? How
can it be proved that the merger will have the least anticompetitive effects if approved? As we will further study,
these questions also remained unanswered under the European regime.

I See Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
8 It is important to recall that Justice Harlan concurred, Justice Steward dissented and Justice Fortas did not participate.
' See Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 291.

WSee Edward 0. Correia, Re-examining the Failing Company Defense,

64 ANTITRUST L.J. 683 (1996).

,See U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
See U.S. v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971).
13 See General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 486.
12
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE IN
EUROPE
After reviewing how the failing firm defense is
constructed under US law, we now turn to the evolution
of the failing firm defense in the EU. We will first review
the provisions under EU legislation where the failing firm
defense is established. Next, we will briefly recall the
most important cases concerning the failing firm defense. In this regard, the applicable test for the failing
firm defense has also been clarified thanks to the European courts' interpretation of the defense.
In Europe, the institution in charge of maintaining
effective competition in the market is the European
Commission (hereinafter, the "Commission"). In order to
fulfill such a task, the main piece of law used by the
Commission to study mergers is Regulation 139/2004,14
which focuses on the control of concentrations between
undertakings (the "EC Merger Regulation"). The enforcement of the EC Merger Regulation is clarified by the EU
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which also gives clearance
with regard to the failing firm doctrine."i
Notably, the EC Merger Regulation remains silent
in relation to the failing firm defense. However, Article
2(2) of the EC Merger Regulation states, "a concentration
which would not significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it,
in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening
of a dominant position, shall be declared compatible
with the common market." 16 The EU Horizontal Merger
Guidelines give some clarification regarding the application of the failing company doctrine in the EU. In this
See Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on
the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L
24) 1 [hereinafter "EC Merger Regulation"].
1 See Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 3 [hereinafter "Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers"].
16See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 14.
'4
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sense, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide that
a problematic merger might be considered compatible
with the common market if one of the merging parties is
a failing firm, as long as there is lack of causality between the merger and the deterioration of the competitive structure.17
In the same line as the US Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide
for a three-step test requiring the following:
(i) the allegedly failing firm would be forced out of
the market if it is not absorbed by another company;
(ii) there is no less anti-competitive alternative
purchaser, and finally;
(iii) that
the assets of the firm in difficulty will exit
18

the market.

It can be anticipated that in practice, when facing
the failing firm defense, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines leave many questions unanswered. For example,
when a firm might be considered failing or how to assess
that there is no other alternative to the merger to avoid
the exit of a company. 9
Similar to the evolution of the failing firm defense
in the US, the applicable test for the European failing
firm defense has also been the result of the evolution of
the case law. In 1991, in the landmark case AleniaAerospatiale/De Havilland,0 the failing firm defense was

See Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers, supra
note 15.
1 See id.
17

See Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers, supra
note 15.
2 See Comm'n Decision of 2 Oct. 1991 Declaring the Incompatibility
with the Common Market of a Concentration (Case No. IV/M.053Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland), 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42 [hereinafter
"Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland"].
'9
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argued for the first time in the EU. 21 The merger involved

the acquisition of De Havilland, a division of Boeing, by
Alenia-Aerospatiale. The resulting merger would have increased Boeing's market share for medium-size turboprop airplane up to 64%. Boeing made the argument that
if it did not acquire De Havilland, the latter would exit
the market. 2 However, the Commission did not accept
such argument and the failing firm defense was dismissed, similar to what the US Supreme Court stated in
the International Shoe case.2 1 Specifically, the Commis-

sion stated:
On the evidence made available to the Commission, there is therefore no likelihood that de
Havilland, in the absence of the proposed concentration, would in any case be phased out.
Boeing has however expressed its preference to
sell de Havilland rather than continue to operate
it. This would seem possible given that the parties are not the only potential buyers. British
Aerospace, for example, has expressed an interest to buy de Havilland.24Some years later, the
Commission clarified the applicable test for enforcement of the failing firm doctrine in Kali &
Salz.2 5 This case continues to serve as the EU
reference point for the failing firm defense test.
In Kali & Salz, the proposed merger affected the
potash market and would have implied the creation of a
monopoly (98% market share) had it been approved."
When establishing the applicable test in the EU, the
21

See loannis Kokkoris, Failing Firm Defence in the European Union:

A Panacea for Mergers?, 27(9) EuR. CoMp. L. REv. 494-509 (2006).
22Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, supra note 20.
23 See Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 291.
24 Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, supra note 20, at para. 31.
21 See Comm'n Decision of 14 Dec. 1993 Relating to a Proceeding
Pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 (Case No.
IV/M.308-Kali+Salz /Mdk/Treuhand), 1994 O.J. (L 186) 38 [hereinafter "Kali+Salz/Mdk/Treuhand"]. This decision was annulled in its
entirety by the ECJ.
26 See id.
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Commission considered the lack of causality between the
increase in the concentration of the market and the dete27
rioration of the competitive structure as the key issues.
The Commission concluded that a failing company defense in the EU could be raised when three conditions
were met: (i) the acquired company would be forced out
of the market without being absorbed by another company; (ii) if the failing company exited the market, its
market shares would be taken over by the acquiring
company; and (iii) there is no less anti-competitive alternative.28 One may conclude that these three requirements
were aimed at explaining the situations when there is a
lack of causality between the increase in the concentration of a market and a proposed merger. Indeed, as the
Commission clearly stated:
Bearing in mind the causality considerations outlined above, a merger leading to the creation or
reinforcement of a dominant position must take
place in such a way as to cause the least possible
damage to competition. This means that any alternative partial disposal of the target company
which will reduce the deterioration of the competitive structure must as a rule be carried out if
the rest of the merger is to be accepted under
merger law.29
The Kali & Salz case is of utmost importance to the
analysis undertaken in this paper because the French
government appealed the Commission's decision basing
its arguments on the fact that the Commission had not
applied the same criteria as the US Antitrust institutions,
thereby enforcing a different test in the EU than the one
existing in the US.3 0
In particular, the French government considered
the second requirement excessive. The French government argued that the acquiring company had to prove
2? See id.
28 See id.
29 Id. at para. 87.
3 See Kokkoris, supra note

21.

306

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 28:2/3

that without the merger, it would acquire the failing
firm's market share entirely.31 The European Court of
Justice (hereinafter, the "ECJ") not only rejected the
French arguments, but also confirmed that the Commission's proposed test was aimed at clarifying that the
proposed merger and the harm done to the competitive
structure lacked a causal relationship. In this regard, the
ECJ clarified that:
The criterion of absorption of market shares,
although not considered by the Commission as
sufficient in itself to preclude any adverse effect
of the concentration on competition, therefore
helps to ensure the neutral effects of the concentration as regards the deterioration of the competitive structure of the market. This is consistent with the concept of causal connection set
out in Article 2(2) of the Regulation.32
Additionally, the ECJ broadened the test proposed by the
Commission by stating that a merger would be cleared,
"if the competitive structure resulting from the concentration would deteriorate in similar fashion even if the
concentration did not proceed."33 The test proposed in
the Kali & Salz merger was later confirmed in 1997 by
the Commission in the Saint Gobain case.34
In 2002, just before the EU Horizontal Merger
Guidelines were published, the Commission decided another important merger for the consolidation of the failing firm defense doctrine in the EU. Indeed, the
BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochimcase3" represented a major de31 See

id.
See Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, French v. Comm'n, Societe Commerciale des Potasses et de l'Azote (SCPA) v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. I1375.
32

31Id. at para. 115.
34 See Comm'n Decision

of 4 Dec. 1996 Declaring a Concentration to
be Incompatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of
the EEA Agreement (Case No. IV/M.774-Saint-Gobain/WackerChemie/NOM), 1996 O.J. (L 247) 1, 10.9 [hereinafter "SaintGobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM).
11See Comm'n Decision of 7 Nov. 2001 Declaring a Concentration to
be Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the
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velopment in the definition of the boundaries of the European failing company defense doctrine. The Commission considered that blocking the merger would have
worse consequences in the market than rendering the
merger legal. 36 Thus, the Commission decided to clear

the merger.17 In this case, the fact that two of the companies, Eurodiol and Pantochim, were placed under a prebankruptcy regime greatly influenced the Commission's
final decision. Indeed, the Belgian authorities stated to
the Commission that the two failing companies would
have been declared bankrupt if they weren't acquired.
Hence, when analyzing whether the three requirements
established in Kali & Salz were fulfilled, the Commission
not only declared that those requirements were met, but
also redefined the test. Significantly, in relation to the
third requirement, the Commission accepted that it was
not necessary to prove that the acquiring company
would have accrued the failing company's entire market
share to comply with such requirement.
Finally, the Commission made it clear that a rescue
merger would only be accepted in the EU when the deterioration of the competitive structure resulting from the
concentration was expected to deteriorate in similar
fashion even if the concentration were not allowed to
proceed. We may conclude by saying that the Commission has included the failing firm defense test in the EU
Horizontal Merger Guidelines as a result of what it had
previously stated in several merger cases, without
providing further clarification on the test. As has happened in the US legal framework, many questions remain
difficult to define in practice. The following section will
deal with some of these controversies that are common
to both the EU and US legal antitrust frameworks.

EEA Agreement (Case No. COMP/M.2314-BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim),
2001 O.J. (L132) 45 [hereinafter "BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim"].
36 See id.
See id.
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IV. COMMON DILEMMAS WHEN APPLYING THE TEST

The regulations and existing case law regarding
the failing firm doctrine do not provide much clarification to its enforcement in real terms. Under the current
section, several dilemmas common to both jurisdictions
will be addressed. First, the question of the definition of
a failing firm will be analyzed. Second, the question of
establishing when there is no alternative purchaser will
be considered.
A. Defining a FailingFirm
A common feature of the EU and the US regime is
that none of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines define
what a failing firm is. Indeed, one of the most difficult
aspects of applying the failing firm doctrine is how to
define when a firm is to be considered failing.
A general definition of what a failing firm is cannot be drafted due to the different economic scenarios
that might surround a potential failing firm;38 therefore, a
case-by-case analysis is deemed necessary. In this respect, the dilemma of defining a failing firm resides on
whether to adopt a broad definition or a more strict definition when analyzing whether a firm could be classified
as failing.
Indeed, on one hand, one may argue that a strict
definition should be given to the failing firm since such
defense represents an exception to an otherwise anticompetitive merger. Hence, if the definition of a failing
firm is broadened too much, it could facilitate the clearance of a large number of mergers, leading to a higher
degree of concentration in the markets to the detriment
of consumers.
On the other hand, if the concept of a failing firm
is defined too narrowly, fewer firms would be able to
claim the failing firm defense, and therefore, only very
See G. Monti & E. Rousseva, Failing Firms in the Framework of the
E.C. Merger Control Regulation, 24 E.J. REv. 24(1), 58 (1999).
38
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extreme cases would be argued successfully. Moreover,
defining a failing firm very strictly could render the defense itself useless since the assets of the failing firm
could be deteriorated to an extent that no company
would be willing to buy it, ultimately leading the failing
company to exit the market. Reaching a middle point between those two positions is tough and, consequently,
has not always been done successfully.
Under the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, as we
have explained in Section 1, a firm that wants to invoke
such defense would: (i) allegedly be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near future, and (ii) not be able
to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act.39 Intuitively, two questions arise from these
two requirements, namely: (1) what time period must be
considered to define when a firm would be unable to
meet its financial obligations, and (2) what is a successful
reorganization? Differently, under the EU Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, only the first requirement of the test
mentions the financial difficulties that a firm must be
facing in order to utilize the failing firm defense. In this
sense, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines require that a
firm would be forced out of the market because of financial difficulties.
The first observation to be made is that the EU's
Guidelines provide a more restrictive definition of a failing firm than the US Guidelines. Indeed, under the US regime, a firm could be considered failing just by not being
able to meet its financial obligations. In comparison, under the EU regime, the firm has to prove that it would be
forced out of the market. The analysis presented below
will show that regardless of the differences existing in
both Horizontal Merger Guidelines, in practice, the consideration of a failing firm has become a quasi-identical
test.
In this sense, in International Shoe, the U.S. Supreme Court defined a failing firm as a firm "with re-

" See 11 U.S.C. §§1101-1174.
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sources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so
remote that it faced the grave probability of business
failure."40 However, this narrow definition of a failing
firm has been criticized and a looser definition has been
favored.
In this regard, it has been argued that a company
should be considered as failing by proving that insolvency or bankruptcy is imminent or highly probable.4 1 Nevertheless, in theory, even if a less narrow approach was
taken into consideration when defining a failing firm, it
would still be very difficult to define when insolvency or
bankruptcy is imminent or highly probable. In practice,
surprisingly, establishing an imminent or highly probable
insolvency has not become a big concern. In most cases,
imminence has not been taken into consideration, but actual insolvency has.42 Another key issue that has been
discussed before US courts is whether, without a potential bankruptcy, a firm could be considered as a failing
firm. This question still remains controversial.43
Rousseva and Monti proposed a new definition of a
failing firm that did not entirely coincide with the US requirements or the EU requirements. In a study published
in 1999, the authors proposed to consider a firm as failing when financial and economic analyses showed a continuous presence of one of the following factors: (i) production costs exceeding sales revenue; (ii) inability to
innovate when other firms are able to do so; or (iii) risk
of assets leaving the industry.44
With reference to this proposal, it is not absolutely
convincing that the authors' test will facilitate the task of
identifying a failing firm. Indeed, both the first and the
second requirements proposed by such authors will only
prove that a firm is inefficient, but not necessarily failing. Hence, those two requirements remain inappropriate
40 Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at
41AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,

302.
supra note5, at para. 9531.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

See Monti & Rousseva, supra note 38.
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to define a failing firm. On the other hand, the consideration of the risk of assets leaving the industry could be a
very significant development in the securitization of a
potential failing firm. As explained by the authors, this
requirement could generate efficiencies, and thus, it remains more important than the risk of insolvency."
If we recall what the ECJ stated in Kali & Salz, we
can conclude that the test in the EU is similar to that in
the US. We can also conclude that the key issue when analyzing a possible failing firm is the financial situation of
an undertaking, as Rousseva and Monti stress. In this
sense, it is important to recall that in the Kali & Salz ruling, the ECJ stated that the company
"[...] was highly like46
ly to close in the near future.

In conclusion, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
give some guidance on how to define a failing firm but
do not enter into much detail. Indeed, the Guidelines talk
about insolvency, bankruptcy, or exit from the market.
Nevertheless, what is important and what the authorities
should consider is the financial situation of a firm in the
particular circumstances at the time the merger is proposed. From the analyses of a company's financial situation, a firm could be considered as failing even before
reaching bankruptcy and even without the fear of it exiting the market if the merger were not to occur. Although
this rule of reason approach could open the gate to numerous possible failing firm defense arguments, it would
be a more realistic and pragmatic approach, which would
ultimately benefit the functioning of the market and,
eventually, consumers.
B. No Alternative Purchaser
The existence of a failing firm is one of the requirements needed to satisfy the failing firm defense
test.47 Additionally, the US and EU jurisdictions both re45Id.
46 Kokkoris,

supra note 21, at para. 120.

4 See Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers, supra
note 15.
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quire the merger to be the only available one in the market. In other words, both jurisdictions require that the
purchase by the proposed acquirer is the only possible
recourse. In this respect, the US Horizontal Merger
Guidelines state that a failing firm has to make "unsuccessful good faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative
offers of acquisition of assets of the failing firm that
would both keep its tangible and intangible assets in the
market and pose a less severe danger to competition
than does the proposed merger. 4 8 The EU Horizontal

Merger Guidelines provide that there must not be a less
anti-competitive alternative to the notified merger.49
The dilemma of the enforcement of this requirement was clearly stated by Justice Steward's dissent in
Citizen Publishing,where he stated, "Today's decision for
the first time lays down the blanket rule that the failing
company defense is forfeited by a company which cannot show that it made substantial affirmative efforts to
sell to a non-competitor.""0 Some authors have argued
that the requirement of no other alternative purchaser is
not relevant to the enforcement of the failing firm defense.51 Those authors consider that such requirement is
irrelevant because if the causal link between the deterioration of the market and the merger is proved nonexistent, then there is no reason to consider whether the
purchaser is already dominant, and thus, will become
more dominant or not.52 This approach seems reasonable
since the causal link between the merger and the deterioration of the market is the key aspect of the failing firm
defense. The third requirement of the EU Horizontal
Merger Guidelines might be considered irrelevant, but
only in the EU.
A similar conclusion could be drawn for the US
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUiDELiNES, supra note 1, at Section 5.1.
See Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers, supra
note 15.
51 See Citizen Pub., 394 U.S. at 131.
" See Antonio Bavasso & Alistair Lindsay, Causation in EC Merger
48

49

Control, 3(2) J. OF COMPETIION L. AND ECONS. 181 (2007).
52

See id.
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model. Indeed, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines require a good faith search by the failing firm to find the
least anti-competitive purchaser; in other words, a preferred purchaser. To comply with this requirement, the
failing firm should do enough diligence to seek other offers and try to find the best one. Under the US regime,
and contrary to what happens in the EU, the good faith
search requirement remains useful. As was confirmed in
the Citizen Publishing case by the US Supreme Court,
"[t]he failing company doctrine plainly cannot be applied
in a merger or in any other case unless it is established
that the company that acquires the failing company or
brings it under dominion is the only available purchaser. 3'

3

Ultimately, in the words of Low, "how to determine

the purchaser that would have the least anticompetitive
effect and whether a minimum purchase price is required remains unclear." 4
Indeed, Low's comment regarding the requirement
of a minimum price remains an unanswered question.
For example, imagine there is a failing firm in a particular market worth US $50. In such market, a dominant
company is ready to pay $100 for the failing firm's assets because this purchase will enable that company to
acquire market share, and consequently strengthen its
market power. On the other hand, there is a small company active in the same market, ready to pay $20 for the
same assets. According to the failing firm defense theory, in such scenario, if the dominant firm proposes to
acquire the failing firm alleging the failing firm defense
exception, such merger should not be cleared because a
less anticompetitive purchaser would exist in the market.
However, if that would be the case, a decision contrary to
all economic reasoning would be adopted, since the alternative purchaser would not pay for the failing firm's
assets at market price. The trade-offs between allowing a
monopoly firm to increase its market power by purchasing a failing firm's assets at a market price or allowing a

Citizen Pub., 394 U.S. at 138.
" See Richard E. Low, The Failing Company Doctrine Revisited, 38
FORDHAM L. REv. 23 (1969).
13
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smaller company to increase its market share by paying a
non-market price are not easy to draft. Therefore, proving that there is no alternative purchaser is a difficult
task with no clear test.
It should be highlighted that the two problems described in this section only prove that the failing firm defense is difficult to enforce in reality. Although the US
and EU Guidelines provide some orientation on how this
doctrine should be enforced, reality shows that each
merger represents a completely different scenario and
thus, antitrust authorities should conduct a rule of reason oriented analysis to authorize or block the merger.
In this respect, as discussed below, the consideration of
what a failing firm is and the determination of when the
alternative purchaser requirement is fulfilled represent
only two obstacles for clearly defining the failing firm
doctrine. In addition to those two problems, another important dilemma remains - the consideration of efficiencies in a merger of a failing firm.
V. THE FAING FIRM DMSION
The most obvious difference that can be found
when comparing the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines to
the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines is that the American
legislation provides for the possibility of a failing division defense, while the European legislation does not.
Nevertheless, the study of European case law shows that
under the EU regime, a failing firm division defense has
also been accepted although not enforced.
In this regard, the US Horizontal Guidelines establish that for the failing division defense to be invoked,
similar conditions to the failing firm test must exist,
namely: (1) the division must have a negative cash flow,
(2) the assets of the division would exit the relevant market if not sold, and (3) the owner of the failing division
must comply with the competitively-preferable purchaser
requirement equivalent to the one applied to the failing
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firm."5 Nevertheless, the application of the failing division defense has been compared to a shipwreck, due to
the fact that US courts have hardly ever applied such defense.56 The most significant case concerning the failing
firm division defense is California v. Sutter Health.7 In
this case, the District Court for the Northern District of
California recognized the existence of the failing division
defense. Eventually, the failing firm defense, and not the
failing division defense, was applied." Consequently, the
failing division defense remains an "unsettled area of
law"5 9 in the US.
On the contrary, under the EU Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, a reference to the failing division defense is
non-existent. As the failing division defense is already
established in the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, more
time will now be devoted to the European case law, as
the defense has been possible in the EU due to a development in case law. In 1997, in the well-known Bertelsmann merger, 0 which, if authorized, would have led to a
monopolization of the German pay TV market, the
Commission clarified that under EU law, if a failing division defense is invoked, "particularly high standards
must be set for establishing that the conditions for a defense on the grounds of lack of a causal link have been
met. ' '61 In this merger, the parties did not fulfill the fail-

ing firm doctrine test as established in the Kali & Salz
case, and, therefore, also failed to prove the lack of causal link between the deterioration of the competitive
structure of the market and the merger; hence, the mer-

11See HORIZONTAL
56

MERGER GUIDEUNES,

supra note 1.

See Amanda L. Wait, Surviving the Shipwreck: A Proposalto Revive

the Failing Division Defense, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 429 (2003).
" California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1133 (N.D.
Cal. 2001).
58

Id.

59Id.
60 See

Comm'n Decision of 27 May 1998 Relating to a Proceeding
Pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 (Case No.
IV/M.993-Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere), 1998 O.J. (C 1439) 19 [hereinafter "Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premierel.
61

Id.
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ger was blocked. 2 By making the failing division defense
more difficult to succeed in a merger, the Commission
was trying to limit the number of cases where such defense would be invoked to avoid accounting manipulation that could render it very easy for an unprofitable
business to be acquired before being closed.63
Some years later, under the Rewe/Meinl case, the
Commission had the opportunity to analyze the arguments in favor and against the consideration of a failing
division defense.6 However, the Commission did not design a new test, but instead applied the same test that
had been established under the Kali & Saltz case. 6

Ac-

cording to the Commission, the burden of proof on such
case was to be discharged by the parties as regards the
lack of causality between the merger and the possible deterioration of the competitive structure, due to the fact
that the transaction was a particularly heavy one. 6 Baccaro envisions the possibility of advocating failing division defense when,*"the deterioration of the competitive
structure would possibly occur if a management decision
to shut down a division was not just part of a strategic
plan; it would have to be based on prospects of inevitable closure of the division in the absence of the merger."67 Therefore, Baccaro suggests that under EU law,
there is an additional requirement that must be fulfilled
when advocating failing division defense.
The same situation happened some years later in
the Newscorp/Telepiu case.68 Once again, the Commis-

62

Id.

See Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 291.
1 Conmm'n Decision of 3 Feb. 1999 Relating to Proceedings Under
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 (Case No. IV/M.1221Rewe/Meinl), 1999 O.J. (C 228) [hereinafter "Rewe/Meinl"].
61 See Kali+Salz/Mdk/Treuhand, supra note 25.
16 Vincenzo Baccaro, FailingFirm Defence and Lack of Causality:Doctrine and Practice in Europe of two Closely Related Concepts, 25 EUR.
COMPETrON L. R. 1, 11 (2004).
67 Id. at 16.
68 See Comm'n Decision of 4 Feb. 2003 Declaring a Concentration to
be Compatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement
63
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sion did not accept the failing division defense because
the necessary causal link had not been appropriately justified. 9 Indeed, the Commission repeatedly said that,
"Newscorp has not been able to demonstrate that there
is no causal link between the concentration and the effect on competition, because conditions of competition
can be expected to deteriorate to a similar or identical
7°
extent even without the concentration in question.

In conclusion, even if the EU Horizontal Merger
Guidelines do not provide for the possibility of having a
failing division defense, de facto, this case could be advocated before the Commission. Therefore, the failing
firm division defense is similarly adopted in both jurisdictions. Indeed, both jurisdictions accept the possibility
of advocating a failing firm division defense. On the other hand, neither of the jurisdictions has enforced such
defense in practice.
VI. THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE IN OLIGOPOLISTIC
MARKETS
The problems that antitrust authorities have to
face when applying the failing firm defense in oligopolistic markets are analyzed in this section. Indeed, the fact
that the clearance of a merger in an oligopolistic market
can lead to or improve a collective dominance is the
main problem created by the use of the rescue merger.
The case where a collective dominance exists prior to the
merger should be treated differently, as if the collective
dominance is the direct consequence of the merger. For
the purpose of illustrating the problems of applying the
failing firm defense in oligopolistic markets, the failing
firm doctrine in oligopolistic markets will be considered
through the analysis of the European cases, although the
conclusions should be the same for the US. That said, it
is interesting to recall that although the EU Horizontal

(Case No. COMP/M.2876-Newscorp/Telepiu),
[hereinafter "Newscorp/Telepiu"].
69

See id.

71

Id. at para. 52.

2003 O.J. (C 1082)
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Merger Guidelines no longer require the existence of a
causal link between the merger and the deterioration of
the market structure, taking into consideration Article 2
(2) of the EC Merger Regulation and the Kali & Saltz case,
such requirement remains crucial. As we will now analyze, the Andersen mergers approve this idea.71
Before analyzing the details of the Andersen cases,
it is important to recall that under the EU, and as it was

stated in the Airtours case, 72 three conditions are neces-

sary for a finding of collective dominance:
(1)"[...] there must, be sufficient market transparency for all members of the dominant oligopoly to be
aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in
which the other members' market conduct is evolving;
(2) second, the situation of tacit coordination must
be sustainable over time; and
(3) third, to prove the existence of a collective
dominant position to the requisite legal standard, the
Commission must also establish that the foreseeable reaction of current and future competitors, as well as of
consumers, would not jeopardise
the results expected
73
from the common policy.

Once the collective dominance position is established in the EU, we now turn to analyze the Andersen
mergers. These mergers were proposed after the Enron
scandal when most of Andersen's national divisions decided to merge with other audit firms. The most recent
merger in the audit market that the Commission had an71 Comm'n

Decision (Case No. COMP/M2816-Ernst &Young
France/Andersen France), 2002 O.J. (L 2985) [hereinafter Ernst &
Young, France]; Comm'n Decision (Case No. COMP/M2824-Ernst &
Young/Andersen Germany) [hereinafter Ernst & Young, Germany];
2002 O.J. (L 2985); Comm'n Decision (Case No. COMP/M.2810Deloitte & Touche/Andersen (UK)), 2002 O.J. (L 2985) [hereinafter Deloitte & Touce/Andersen (UK)].
72 Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585.
71Id. at 2613-14.
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alyzed was the Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand
merger.74 In that merger, the Commission concluded that
"... any reduction in the number of suppliers in the Big
Six audit market for large companies constitutes a further element which might be conducive to collective
dominance. However, the Commission's investigation has
not led to the conclusion that the merger
would create a
75
situation of oligopolistic dominance.

The Commission, when analyzing the Andersen
mergers, did not literally consider the failing firm defense, and hence, did not apply the corresponding test.
In its analysis, the Commission examined whether the
envisioned deterioration on the audit market would be
the result of the merger, or, on the contrary, whether
such deterioration would occur independent of the mer-

ger. 76 The Commission scrutinized these mergers by try-

ing to identify whether the situation of collective dominance was the result of the proposed mergers. However,
the ECJ considered that the key question to be analyzed
under the failing firm defense was the relationship between a transaction and the deterioration of the competitive structure of the market. Therefore, it might be concluded that although the failing firm defense was not
mentioned in the Andersen cases, the analysis that the
Commission carried out mirrored the test applied when
enforcing the failing firm defense.
In this sense, some authors, like Joergens, are of
the opinion that when analyzing the Andersen cases, the
Commission applied a "sort of truncated failing company

74See

Comm'n Decision of 20 May 1998 Declaring a Concentration to
be Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the
EEA Agreement (Case No. IV/M.1016-Price Waterhouse/Coopers &
Lybrand), 1998 O.J. (C 1338) [hereinafter PriceWaterhouse/Coopers

& Lybrand].
Id. at 25.
Konstantin Joergens, Andersen and the "FailingFirm": The Application of the "FailingFirm Defence" in Merger Proceedings Involving Firms Providing Professional Services," 26(3) WORLD COMPETITION
363 (2003).
76 See
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defense."77 Hence, the Commission, instead of applying
the three-prong-analysis of the failing firm defense, concentrated in the causality connection as set out in Article
2 (2) of the Merger Regulation. 8 Differently, other authors, such as Jackson, are of the view that the Conmission only focused on the causal link analysis as set out in
Article 2 (2) of the Merger Regulation, without considering the failing firm defense at all. 19
However, whether the Commission applied a strict
failing firm test remains secondary to the question dealt
with in this section. Indeed, the important detail to highlight in these cases is that the Commission did not consider that, in the European audit market, there was a collective dominance position prior to the proposed
Andersen mergers." Therefore, it proved easier for the
Commission to clear such mergers, as a previous dominant position would not be reinforced whether or not the
failing firm defense was applied in a strict sense. The
case probably would have been different if the Commission had considered that a collective dominant position
existed before the proposed merger. In such hypothesis,
the mergers would have been blocked, because it would
have been difficult to prove that the proposed mergers
would not cause a distortion of the existing competitive
conditions.
In summary, it may be said that the failing company defense is easier to accept in an oligopolistic market
where collective dominance does not exist prior to the
proposed merger. However, if a collective dominance position exists before the merger is cleared, then a failing
firm defense would be accepted only in exceptional cases, because it would be very difficult to prove that such
merger would not improve the market position of the
acquirer, and thus, render the market conditions less
See id.
78 See

id.

See D. Jackson, Failing Firm Defense, The Andersen Mergers - A
New Approach to the Failing Firm Principle?, 1 COMPETITION LAW
INSIGHT 11 (Nov. 2002).
80

See Joergens, supra note 76.
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competitive than they were prior to the merger.
Finally, it is important to note that, although in the
US the development of the concept of collective dominance has not succeeded,8' the same conclusion could be
reached in the US with regard to the application of the
failing firm defense in oligopolistic markets. Indeed,
when there is an oligopoly in which the tendency is to
collude, and such situation exists prior to a merger involving a failing firm, the acceptance of the failing firm
defense would be less likely than if the collusive situation did not exist prior to the merger.
VII. THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE AND THE EFFICIENCIES
Both the US and the EU, in the past few years, have
understood the need to progressively and increasingly
introduce the rule of reason as an instrument to modernize their competition policies. One clear sign of such
desire to promote a modern approach to antitrust policies is the consideration of efficiencies under merger
control cases. In this sense, although the main regulations do not foresee the possibility of advocating efficiencies in a merger clearance procedure, several reforms
have been carried out in relation to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines to include the consideration of efficiencies in both jurisdictions.
In 1997, the US was the first jurisdiction to carry
out a reform of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines83 to add
a provision on efficiencies. In relation to the consideration of efficiencies when analyzing mergers, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognize that "efficiencies
generated through a merger can enhance the merged
firm's ability and incentive to compete, which may result
in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or

81 Sahin

Ardiyok, ComparativeAnalysis of Collective Dominance, 3 J.

OF YEDITEPE U. 1 (2008).
82 See

generally Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551

U.S. 877 (2007).

"IHoRIzoNTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 1.
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new products."84 Hence, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines only refer to merger-specific efficiencies, that is,
improvements to be obtained only through the proposed
merger.
To put it succinctly, as Pitofsky states, the efficiency considerations under US law need at least four qualifications: "(i) The alleged efficiencies must be verifiable; (ii)
The efficiencies must be timely, likely and sufficient to
overcome anticompetitive effects; (iii) The efficiencies
must not grow out of an anticompetitive reduction in
output or service; and (iv) Efficiencies [will] almost never
justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.""5
Therefore, the proposed checks and balances test to be
applied to efficiencies by the antitrust agencies consists
of balancing the effects of cognizable efficiencies vis-dvis the merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market. Indeed, the passing on of benefits to consumers active in the relevant markets has turned out to
be one of the cornerstones of the efficiencies analysis in
merger control policies in the US. 6
The European approach to efficiencies is somewhat similar to the US approach. The EU Merger Regulation provides in provision 2(1)(b) that "technical and
economic progress provided it is to the consumers' advantage should be taken into account."87 However, the
inclusion of efficiencies considerations in the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines88 occurred only in 2004. The
description of the efficiencies contained in the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines is structured differently compared to the efficiencies test under the US Horizontal
Merger Guidelines. Indeed, the EU Guidelines divide the
Id.
"'Robert Pitofsky, Efficiency Consideration and Merger Enforcement:
Comparison of U.S. and EU Approaches, 30 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1413
84

(2006-2007).
86 Brian A. Facey & Henry Huser, A Comparison of Horizontal
Merger

Guidelines in Canada, the European Union, and the United States, 19
ANTITRUST 43 (2004-2005).
87 See EC Merger Regulation,
8 Id.

supra note 14.
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efficiencies considerations into three main sections: (i)
benefit to consumers; (ii) merger specificity; and (iii) verifiability. 89 It is important to recall that likewise under the
US regime, the EU considers that efficiencies must be
passed on to consumers. However, it is important to advance at this point that, in the EU, efficiencies are considered as one part of the welfare enhancement test as a
whole that ultimately must compensate for the negative
consequences of the merger in its entirety.
In relation to the consideration of efficiencies and
the failing firm defense, the determination on how a
dominant firm would perform in the market remains the
key question. In this regard, scholars have taken very different positions. Indeed, Posner, for example, rejects the
possibility of taking efficiencies into consideration when
analyzing mergers 90 McChesney, on the contrary, suggests that the "acquisition of a failing firm is always efficient."'" Rousseva and Monti argue that when analyzing
efficiencies in the acquisition of a failing firm, the degree
of failure of the firm as well as the level of dominance of
the acquirer are the key issues.92 Others such as Jones
and Gondlez-Diaz have suggested that where dominance
exists, efficiencies cannot be taken into consideration,
arguing that, "if a strong dominant position is acquired,
monopoly prices will be charged." 93 This idea has been
adopted by both the US and the EU Guidelines. 94 Indeed,
the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that "efficien-

89 Id.

See Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 291.
91Fred S. McChesney, Defending the Failing-FirmDefense, 65 NEB. L.
"I

REv. 1, 3 (1986).
92 See Monti & Rousseva, supra note 38.
93

Christopher Jones & Enrique Gonzalez-Diaz,

THE

EEC

MERGER

(1992).
" In this regard, the US Horizontal Guidelines state "efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near monopoly." The
EU Horizontal Guidelines, on the other hand, establish that "it is
highly unlikely that a merger leading to a market position approaching that of a monopoly, or leading to a similar level of market power,
can be declared compatible with the common market on the ground
of efficiency gains."
REGULATION
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cies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near
monopoly."9 5 The EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines, on
the other hand, establish that "it is highly unlikely that a
merger leading to a market position approaching that of
a monopoly, or leading to a similar level of market power, can be declared compatible with the common market
on the ground of efficiency gains.""
Indeed, the main dilemma when analyzing the possibility of considering efficiencies when the failing firm
defense is advocated in a merger is the problem of considering the possibility of advocating efficiencies in a
merger involving a dominant or almost dominant firm
that will strengthen its market power through the merger. In this respect, the US & EU Guidelines advance that
the consideration of efficiencies in a merger leading to a
monopoly is basically impossible, but they do not expressly forbid them. Indeed, the US Horizontal Merger
Guidelines textually say that, "efficiencies almost never
justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly."97 In
other words, there is a small probability that efficiencies
may justify a merger resulting in a monopoly. That said,
the failing firm defense should not represent the exceptional case where efficiencies could be taken into account
to justify a merger resulting in a monopoly. However, as
will be defended herewith, it could be considered that
the failing firm defense itself represents an efficienciesbased approach to the analysis of mergers. In other
words, the test upon which the failing firm defense is
based is an efficiencies-oriented test and consequently a
disguised form of considering efficiencies.
In order to develop this idea, it is important to recall the concept that the consideration of efficiencies is a
question of balancing pro- and anti-competitive effects
that a potential acquisition may bring about. If we think
about how efficiencies could justify the creation of a
monopoly when a failing firm exits the market, it beg See Correia, supra note 10.
96

See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 14.

9'See Correia, supra note 10.
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comes easy to think that a monopoly would always be
created even without the merger, because the failing firm
would otherwise exit the market, and thus, the remaining
undertaking would eventually increase its market share.
However, it is also true that by acquiring a failing firm,
the dominant firm will increase its market power, as it
would increase its productive capacity and thus, it would
be easier to increase its prices to the detriment of consumers.
Following Friedman's conclusions, one could argue
that the merger involving a failing firm is not a case
where an active firm is killed by the acquisition of the
dominant firm, but that the merger is equivalent to internal growth.98 Even then, a balancing test on whether
the firm would have grown in such way without the merger is vital, and in practice it is a very difficult test to
carry out ex ante.
On the contrary, if the merger does not take place,
the dominant firm will eventually monopolize the market. Nevertheless, in the latter scenario, the firm does not
become more efficient. Therefore, to gain market power
it would have to behave differently and in a more competitive way - at least in the short term than if it had acquired the failing firm. Consequently, the possibility of
increasing its prices, at least for the initial time period,
would remain lower in the second scenario."
This is precisely the balancing test set out through
the requirements of the test of the failing firm defense.
Therefore, the key question concerning the consideration
of efficiencies and failing firms rests on how to compare
the way the acquiring firm would behave in the market
with or without acquiring the failing company, and how
the competitive structure of the market would change
with or without the merger. In other words, the analysis
of the causal link between the consequences of the mer-

98

Richard D. Friedman, Untangling the Failing Company Doctrine, 64

TEx. L. REv. 1375 (1986).
99 See Monti & Rousseva, supra note 38.
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ger and the distortion of the market structure remains
the key question.
The complexity of balancing the trade-offs in mergers involving a failing firm that must be carried out before the merger is enforced makes defining such balancing extremely difficult. Indeed, as has been analyzed in
this paper, each of the requirements that a merger involving a failing firm must fulfill are not clearly delineated and are not without practical enforcement problems.
Finally, and independently of whether the failing
firm defense is actually a disguised efficiencies test, the
analysis of the failing firm defense and the consideration
of efficiencies reveals one of the biggest concerns when
dealing with efficiencies in a broader context. That concern relates to the dominance or increase in market power of the acquiring firm.
VIII. THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE FAILING
FIRM DEFENSE: THE U.S. V. THE E.U. APPROACH

A crucial difference between the US and the EU is
that the US is a federal state and the EU is not. As obvious as this difference might seem at first glance, it appears to be of utmost importance with regards to the different aims and objectives that underlie their
competition and other policies, and for the purpose of
enforcing the failing firm defense.
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 to deal with
the trusts that were controlling several markets. Those
trusts were created by combining in one enterprise the
power to make pricing and output decisions for entire
industries, such as oil, sugar, tobacco, and whiskey. 100
Therefore, in the US, antitrust policy was conceived to
enable the market to function in a competitive manner.

100 Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic & Jonathan B. Baker, ANTITRUST
LAw IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY
(2d ed. 2002).
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Under the US regime, Posner's view has apparently
governed the merger clearance procedures. Indeed, as
expressed in this paper, the "failing firm defense is one
of the clearest examples in antitrust law of a desire to
1 1 The US Horsubordinate competition to other values.""
izontal Guidelines, as analyzed above, only provide for
the consideration of economic efficiencies when dealing
with a failing firm as long as such efficiencies are passed
on to consumers. Therefore, under US antitrust law, it is
clear that social concerns do not have a role when analyzing rescue mergers.
In contrast, the EU competition policy is not only
used to maintain an undistorted competition within the
internal market, but is also used as an instrument to attain the Community objectives, thus helping to build the
path towards an ever closer union. In this regard, the ECJ
stated that:
[Alccording to Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty102
(now, after amendment, Article 3(1) (g) EC), Article 85 of the Treaty constitutes a fundamental
provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community
and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market. The importance of such a provision led the framers of the Treaty to provide expressly, in Article 85(2) of the Treaty, that any
agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to
that article are to be automatically void. 103

101See Int'l Shoe, 280
102 Article 3(g) of the

U.S. at 291.
EC Treaty reads: "For the purposes set out in Ar-

ticle 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as provided in
this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein: [...]

(g) a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not
distorted." Treaty Establishing the European Community, Art. 3(g),
2002 O.J. (C 325-33).
103 Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Limited v. Benetton International, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3055.
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Prima facie, we should conclude that there is a mandate
in the EU stating that competition policy should take into
consideration social and environmental concerns, whereas in the US, the legislation remains silent in this respect.
However, further analysis needs to be done with regards
to this preliminary conclusion. Indeed, the analysis of
the failing firm defense is the perfect framework to
study the extent to which social and environmental concerns are relevant when drafting competition analysis,
and more importantly, to what extent such concerns can
be invoked. °4 In practice, both the ECJ and the US Supreme Court have had the opportunity to adopt a position on this question. Indeed, in the case of Vittel & Others v. Commission,0' the Court of First Instance ("CFI")
stated that:
For that purpose it must be noted to begin with
that in the scheme of Regulation No 4064/89,
the primacy given to the establishment of a system of free competition may in certain cases be
reconciled, in the context of the assessment of
whether a concentration is compatible with the
common market, with the taking into consideration of the social effects of that operation if they
are liable to affect adversely the social objectives
referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty. The Commission may therefore have to ascertain whether
the concentration is liable to have consequences,
even if only indirectly, for the position of the
employees in the undertakings in question, such
as to affect the level or conditions of employment
it.
10 in the Community or a substantial part of
Monti and Rousseva have argued that "the rescue
of a failing firm is consistent with Community policy objectives and not inconsistent with the Merger regulations.

104

David Banks, Non-Competition Factors and their Future Relevance

under European Merger Law, 3 EuR. COMMON L. REv. 182 (1997).
10' Case T-12/93, Comit6 Central d'Entreprise de la Soci~t6 Anonyme
Vittel v. Eur. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-1247.
106

Id.

2016

FailingFirm Defense

329

To insist that the Merger Regulation is purely efficiencybased is therefore against the express recommendation
of the Court of First Instance ("CFI") and inconsistent
with the text of the Merger Regulation."" 7 Such an approach seems too theoretical. In fact, when deciding Vittel & Others, the CFI was not setting a general rule
whereby social and environmental concerns should be
taken into account when analyzing mergers in addition
to the efficiencies test. The CFI expressly mentions that
such reconciliation can only be considered in certain cases, where the operation might adversely affect the social
objectives previously framed under Article 2 of the EC
Treaty."'8
Therefore, the development of case law should be
directed towards defining the meaning of "adverse effects." Even in the case where the circumstances under
which social concerns should be considered were clarified, it still remains difficult to imagine a test whereby
social concerns could be balanced vis-a-vis the increase
in market power of the acquiring company. Indeed, it is
extremely complicated to quantify the social benefits
that a merger can bring about, and much more difficult
to set the trade-offs between such social advantages and
the anticompetitive effects of the merger. In other words,
quantifying the benefits of trading apples for oranges
has always been a controversial problem.
This is why it could be well advanced that such social considerations should only be considered in certain
situations, i.e. economic crisis, where the exit of a failing
firm would have a higher degree of possibility of adversely affecting the European objectives and values in
its integrity. Therefore, when at a European level it is decided that social concerns should be balanced with regards to a failing firm, they should be taken into consideration, because it will represent that in that particular
market, and that particular moment, there is a substan-

107See
108

Monti & Rousseva, supra note 38.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European

Community art. 2, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37.
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tial problem that needs a short-term solution for the sake of the European values, such as the current financial
crisis.
Finally, it is important to highlight the idea that
the need or will to consider social and environmental issues when analyzing a merger from an antitrust perspective only reflects a poor enhancement of a particular social and environmental policy. Indeed, when such
situations arise, one should only conclude that there has
been an unparalleled development of the economic and
social/environmental policies in that society. In other
words, the conclusion should be that there has been an
unsustainable social development for which the organizations in charge of antitrust should not be responsible.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to clarify the enforcement of the failing company defense both in the US and
in the EU. It has also attempted to explore the main problems common to both jurisdictions that the enforcement
of the failing firm defense brings about. In this regard,
and as a way of summarizing the most important points
of the current analysis, the following conclusions have
been reached: (1) The failing firm defense is a judiciallyconstructed doctrine that has been subject to judicial
creativity and a "rule of reason" oriented approach employed by the courts when analyzing critical mergers; (2)
The current tests applicable under both the US and EU
are very similar, although in the EU, the causal link between the merger and the deterioration of the market
structure remains the key issue; (3) Even though it is difficult to establish the requirements needed to classify a
firm as failing, the risk of assets leaving the industry and
the financial situation of a company in a precise moment
should be the factors to consider when defining a failing
firm; (4) When dealing with the requirement that no other alternative purchaser should exist in the market, the
questions of which purchaser would have the least anticompetitive effect and whether a minimum purchase
price is required remain controversial and without clear
answers; (5) The application of the failing division de-
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fense is quasi-identical in both jurisdictions: de jure possible, but de facto never accepted; (6) The enforcement of
the failing firm defense in oligopolistic markets is a difficult issue. Where a collective dominant position or a
collusive situation exists prior to the controversial merger, the adoption of the failing company defense will be
more difficult than if such pre-established condition
does not exist; (7) The test proposed under the failing
firm defense test is, by itself, an efficiencies-based test.
In other words, the failing firm defense represents a disguised way of taking efficiencies into consideration, even
when dominance exists; (8) Finally, the authorities in
charge of enforcing antitrust laws should not be responsible for dealing with social and environmental concerns.
Those concerns should be taken into account only in
very limited cases when considering the failing firm defense. Trading apples for oranges has always been a difficult task, since it is impossible to quantify the tradeoffs between them. Therefore, such checks and balances
should not be carried out.
A final remark related to this paper's introductory
comments would be that the failing firm defense is a
clear example of how antitrust law should be enforced to
the benefit of consumers by placing emphasis on the
economic reasoning behind its enforcement. Indeed, the
adoption of the failing company defense represents an
intelligent rule of reason-oriented use of the antitrust
rules to maintain the competition in the markets. It also
signifies that the competition analysis should be carried
out on a case-by-case basis, always taking into consideration the particular circumstances that surround a transaction.
Now that the economy is hurting, antitrust authorities should try to limit administrative economies as
much as possible in favor of scrutinizing each transaction in detail. The birth of the failing firm defense is the
result of a pragmatic and consumer-oriented enforcement of the antitrust rules conditioned by the economic
situation governing the time when it was conceived. Similarly, our societies need any help available to overcome
the current financial crisis, and antitrust laws certainly
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play a role. In this regard, the authorities in charge of enforcing the antitrust rules should be aware of the importance of antitrust rules in times of economic distress.
Therefore, they should use the best economic reasoning-especially vis-A-vis the consideration of efficiencies-when analyzing a transaction. Consumers deserve
so.

